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Avian influenza is an infection caused by avian influen-
za (bird flu) viruses, which occur naturally among birds. 
Wild birds worldwide carry the viruses in their intestines, 
but usually do not get sick. However, avian influenza is 
very contagious among birds and can cause illness and dea-
th in some domesticated birds, including chickens, ducks, 
and turkeys. The virus can transmit from birds to humans, 
causing lethal infections, but as yet the virus does not ea-
sily transmit from human to human. However, there is a 
substantial risk of either re-assortment of virus (combina-
tion of avian and human influenza), or adaptation of the 
influenza virus to humans. The present situation in Tur-
key emphasizes the importance of good surveillance and 
updated pandemic plans in all countries.
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The recent avian influenza epidemic in Asia 
has been an effective reminder to the public he-
alth community of the world’s vulnerability to 
emerging epidemics. The importance of early in-
terventions to prevent a pandemic cannot be un-
derestimated. The alarm bells that went off in 
December 2003 (1) are still ringing, keeping the 
threat of a large pandemic real.
All influenza A epidemics in humans origi-
nate from birds, and the advent of a new epi-
demic virus strain is mostly the result of viral 
re-assortment, ie “antigenic shift” (2,3). This 
is a process in which genetic material from a 
pure avian influenza A virus and an influenza 
virus adapted to humans mix in the same host 
– a pig or a human.
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Avian influenza
Influenza viruses that infect birds are called 
avian influenza viruses. Only influenza A viru-
ses infect birds, and all known subtypes of influ-
enza A viruses can infect birds (4). However, the-
re are substantial genetic differences between the 
subtypes that typically infect both humans and 
birds. Within subtypes of avian influenza A viru-
ses, there are also different strains. Avian influen-
za A H5 and H7 viruses can be distinguished as 
“low pathogenic” and “high pathogenic” forms, 
respectively, on the basis of genetic features of 
the virus and the severity of the illness they cau-
se in poultry; influenza H9 virus has been identi-
fied only in a “low pathogenicity” form (5). Each 
of these three avian influenza A viruses (H5, H7, 
and H9) can theoretically be partnered with any 
one of nine neuraminidase surface proteins; thus, 
there are potentially nine different forms of each 
subtype, eg, H5N1, H5N2, H5N3, or H5N9 
(5). Although avian influenza A viruses usually 
do not infect humans, more than 100 confirmed 
cases of human infection with avian influenza vi-
ruses have been reported since 1997 (5).
Most cases of avian influenza infection in hu-
mans are thought to have resulted from direct 
contact with infected poultry or contaminated 
surfaces. Since 1997, human infections with avian 
influenza A viruses have not resulted in sustained 
human-to-human transmission. However, becau-
se influenza A viruses have the potential to change 
and gain the ability to spread easily among people, 
monitoring for human infection and person-to-
person transmission is important (4).
Do migratory birds spread highly 
pathogenic avian influenza viruses?
The role of migratory birds in the spread of 
highly pathogenic avian influenza is not fully un-
derstood. Wild waterfowl is considered a natural 
reservoir of all influenza A viruses (6-8). The wa-
terfowls have probably carried influenza viruses, 
with no apparent harm, for centuries. They are 
known to carry H5 and H7 virus subtypes, but 
usually their low pathogenic form. Considerable 
circumstantial evidence suggests that migratory 
birds can introduce low pathogenic H5 and H7 
viruses, which then mutate to the highly patho-
genic form, to poultry flocks (6-8).
What is special about the current 
outbreaks in poultry?
The current outbreaks of highly pathogenic 
avian influenza, which began in Southeast Asia 
in mid-2003, are the largest and most severe on 
record. Never before in the history of this disease 
have so many countries been simultaneously af-
fected, resulting in the loss of so many birds (7). 
The causative agent, H5N1 virus, has been pro-
ved to be especially tenacious. Despite the death 
or destruction of an estimated 150 million birds, 
the virus is now considered endemic in many 
parts of Indonesia and Viet Nam and in some 
parts of Cambodia, China, Thailand, and possi-
bly also the Lao People’s Democratic Republic. 
Control of the disease in poultry is expected to 
take several years (9,10). From mid-December 
2003 through early February 2004, poultry ou-
tbreaks caused by the H5N1 virus were reported 
in eight Asian nations (listed in order of repor-
ting): the Republic of Korea, Viet Nam, Japan, 
Thailand, Cambodia, Lao People’s Democratic 
Republic, Indonesia, and China (Table 1). Most 
of these countries had never before experienced 
an outbreak of highly pathogenic avian influenza 
(8,12). In early August 2004, Malaysia reported 
the first outbreak of H5N1 in poultry, becoming 
the ninth Asian country affected. Russia repor-
ted its first H5N1 outbreak in poultry in late July 
2005, followed by reports of disease in adjacent 
parts of Kazakhstan in early August (13). Deat-
hs of wild birds from highly pathogenic H5N1 
were reported in both countries. Almost simul-
taneously, Mongolia reported the detection of 
H5N1 in dead migratory birds (13). In October 
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2005, H5N1 was confirmed in poultry in Tur-
key and Romania. Outbreaks in wild and dome-
stic birds are under investigation in other coun-
tries, too (13-16).
Why are pandemics such dreaded 
events?
Influenza pandemics are remarkable events 
that can rapidly infect virtually all countries. 
Once international spread begins, pandemics are 
considered unstoppable as they are caused by a 
virus spreading very rapidly by coughing or snee-
zing. The fact that infected people can shed vi-
rus before symptoms appear, adds to the risk of 
international spread via asymptomatic air trave-
lers (17). The severity of disease and the number 
of deaths caused by a pandemic virus vary greatly, 
and cannot be known prior to the emergence of 
the virus. During past pandemics, attack rates re-
ached 25%-35% of the total population. Under 
the best circumstances, assuming that the new 
virus causes mild disease, the world could sti-
ll experience an estimated 2-7.4 million deaths 
(projected from data obtained during the 1957 
pandemic). Projections for a more virulent virus 
are much higher. The 1918 pandemic, which was 
exceptional, killed at least 40 million people (18). 
In the USA, the mortality rate during that pan-
demic was around 2.5% (18).
Pandemics can cause large surges in the num-
bers of people requiring or seeking medical or 
hospital treatment, temporarily overwhelming 
health services. High rates of worker absenteeism 
can also interrupt other essential services, such as 
law enforcement, transportation, and communi-
cations. Because populations will be fully suscep-
tible to an H5N1-like virus, rates of illness could 
peak fairly rapidly within a given community. 
They may, however, be amplified in today’s clo-
sely interrelated and interdependent systems of 
trade and commerce. Based on past experience, a 
second wave of global spread should be anticipa-
ted within a year.
As all countries are likely to experience emer-
gency conditions during a pandemic, opportu-
nities for inter-country assistance, such as those 
seen during natural disasters or localized disease 
outbreaks, may be curtailed once the internatio-
nal spread has begun and governments focus on 
protecting domestic populations (19).
Situation in Turkey
The Ministry of Health in Turkey has con-
firmed its first two cases of human infection ca-
used by an avian influenza H5 virus subtype on 
December 31, 2005. Both cases were fatal. They 
occurred in two family members in the rural dis-
trict of Dogubayazit, in the eastern province of 
Agri, which borders Iran and Armenia. A 14-
year-old boy was hospitalized on January 1, 2006 
and died on the same day. His 15-year-old sister 
was hospitalized on January 1, 2006, and died on 
January 5, 2006. Two cases were hospitalized be-
cause of high fever (>39°C) and cough. Altho-
ugh many symptoms of bird flu are the same as 
in other respiratory infections, in addition there 
is a sudden onset of three-day fever, with musc-
le pain and a degree of prostration that is out of 
proportion in comparison with the severity of 
other symptoms. These two cases mark the first 
Table 1. Cumulative number of confirmed human cases of avian influenza A/(H5N1) reported to the World Health Organization*
No. od cases
Cambodia China Indonesia Thailand Turkey Viet Nam Total
Year of onset case death case death case death case death case death case death case death
2003 0 0   0 0   0   0   0   0   0 0   3   3     3   3
2004 0 0   0 0   0   0 17 12   0 0 29 20   46 32
2005 4 4  7 3 16 11  5   2   0 0 61 19   93 39
2006 0 0   3 3  1  1   0   0 21 4   0   0  25   8
Total 4 4 10 6 17 12 22 14 21 4 93 42 167 82
*World Health Organization reports only laboratory-confirmed cases (ref. 11).
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confirmed reports of human infection with avian 
influenza outside East Asia.
Preliminary information suggests that the 
two patients acquired their infection after close 
contact with chickens. Although no poultry ou-
tbreak has been officially reported in Dogubaya-
zit district, a confirmed outbreak of H5N1 avian 
influenza in chickens and ducks was reported on 
December 27, 2005, in the neighboring provin-
ce of Igdir.
According to the latest information recei-
ved from the joint team of experts, as of Janu-
ary 8, 2006, a total of 13 avian influenza (H5) 
cases have been confirmed by virus isolation in 
8 provinces (Igdir, Erzurum, Sanli Urfa, Erzin-
can, Agri, Bitlis, Yozgat, and Ankara), mostly in 
backyard flocks. Within the Ankara region, avi-
an influenza (H5) virus was isolated in one wild 
duck. The very bad weather condition in Eastern 
Turkey makes any technical intervention very di-
fficult and also favors a longer survival of the ani-
mal virus in the environment. Neighboring co-
untries may also be susceptible to avian influenza 
outbreaks and should therefore increase their le-
vels of surveillance.
January 5, 2006
National authorities have informed World 
Health Organization (WHO) that Dogubayazit 
district has been placed under quarantine; no pe-
ople or animals are allowed to move in or out of 
the district. Culling operations are currently un-
der way. Since January 2004, a total of 142 hu-
man cases of H5N1 infection have been reported 
in Viet Nam, Thailand, Cambodia, Indonesia, 
and China (10). The cases in Turkey bring the 
number of affected countries to six, from which 
144 cases have now been reported.
Turkey reported its first outbreak of H5N1 
avian influenza in poultry in mid-October 2005. 
That outbreak, which occurred in the northwe-
stern part of the country, was attributed to con-
tact between domestic poultry and migratory 
waterfowl. The outbreak in Igdir and other sus-
pected outbreaks in this part of the country are 
thought to have occurred following introduction 
of the virus by migratory birds. The region, whi-
ch has several large lakes, is known to lie along 
migratory routes (Figure 1).
January 7, 2006
The Ministry of Health in Turkey has con-
firmed an additional two cases of human infec-
Figure 1. Migratory routes of birds and possible paths of H5N1 avian influenza virus spread.
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tion with the H5N1 avian influenza virus. Both 
cases were children, aged 5 and 8 years, and both 
were hospitalized. This brought the total number 
of laboratory-confirmed cases in Turkey to four. 
Two of these cases were fatal.
January 9, 2006
Laboratory tests conducted in Turkey have 
confirmed detection of the H5 subtype of avian 
influenza virus in samples from an additional 10 
patients. Five of these cases were announced by 
the Ministry of Health on January 8 and additi-
onal five on January 9, 2006. Most patients were 
children and all have been hospitalized for trea-
tment and evaluation. Of the five patients anno-
unced on January 8, three were from Ankara 
Province – two brothers, aged 5 and 2 years, and 
a 65-year-old man. All three patients were hos-
pitalized in Ankara. The additional two cases, a 
9-year-old girl and her 3-year-old brother, were 
from the Dogubayazit district in Agri Province, 
and were hospitalized in the city of Van. The five 
cases announced on January 9, 2006 were from 
Kastamonu, Corum, and Samsun provinces, bor-
dering the Black Sea in the north-central part of 
the country, and from Van Province in the East 
Anatolia. This brings the total number of cases in 
Turkey, confirmed by laboratory tests, to 14 as of 
January 9, 2006. Of these patients, two have died. 
WHO will add these numbers to its cumulative 
total following further verification by an external 
H5 reference laboratory. The quality of laboratory 
testing at Turkey’s National Influenza Centre in 
Ankara is high. Results from the tests conducted 
there the previous week were fully confirmed by 
a WHO collaborating laboratory in the United 
Kingdom (UK). WHO considers it likely that 
test results on the newly announced cases will be 
confirmed by the UK laboratory, where samples 
are being sent for further analysis.
H5N1 is the only strain within the H5 su-
btype known to infect humans. In the event of a 
confirmed H5N1 outbreak in birds, it is expec-
ted that human cases of avian influenza will 
be caused by the same virus strain. The initial 
WHO team, accompanied by the Turkish Mini-
ster of Health, arrived in Van Province on Janu-
ary 8, 2006. The team investigated the epidemio-
logical situation, assessing risk factors and control 
measures, and discussed with local authorities the 
possible need for additional equipment and su-
pplies. The team also assessed patients in the Van 
hospital where some 38 people are currently be-
ing treated and evaluated for possible H5N1 in-
fection. The initial investigation has found no 
evidence that the virus has increased its transmi-
ssibility or is spreading from person to person. 
Most persons under investigation are children, 
often from the same family, and almost all have 
a documented link to dead or diseased poultry. 
Outbreaks in poultry are now known to be occu-
rring in several parts of the country. In recent 
days, the Ministry of Agriculture has confirmed 
H5N1 outbreaks in birds in 10 of the country’s 
81 provinces. Extensive culling is under way and 
several other possible outbreaks are under inve-
stigation.
With the agreement of the Ministry of He-
alth of Turkey, two epidemiologists and two 
experts in laboratory diagnosis will join the ini-
tial WHO team. Given the present high level of 
awareness of the disease and its presence in po-
ultry in several parts of the country, the num-
ber of people concerned about possible exposu-
re is expected to increase. This additional support 
should expedite understanding of the epidemio-
logical situation and increase the capacity to ra-
pidly confirm or rule out persons under investi-
gation for possible infection.
The European Commission has been infor-
med through the WHO that available results 
from National and University Laboratories in 
Ankara suggest that four people, including a boy 
and a girl who died respectively on January 7 and 
8, 2006, have been infected with avian influen-
za virus. There may be additional suspected ca-
ses. An outbreak of this disease was confirmed in 
chickens in eastern Turkey, in the vicinity of the 
Croat Med J 2006;47:7-15
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border with Armenia and Iran, a few days ago. A 
community veterinary expert, who is also a mem-
ber of the World Organization for Animal He-
alth/Food and Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations (OIE/FAO) network of exper-
tise for Avian Influenza (OFFLU), an epidemi-
ologist from the European Centre for Disease 
Prevention and Control (ECDC) together with 
WHO experts, arrived Turkey on January 9, 
2006 to review the situation in cooperation with 
the Turkish authorities. In the meantime, sam-
ples from the sick chickens, which might have 
transmitted the disease to humans, are expec-
ted to arrive at the Community Reference La-
boratory for Avian Influenza in Weybridge. This 
will clarify whether the animal outbreak was due 
to the deadly H5N1 strain of avian influenza. 
The Turkish authorities are also sending sam-
ples from the human cases to a WHO reference 
laboratory in Colindale (UK), to confirm if the 
virus in question is the same as that in the chic-
kens. The European Commission together with 
the ECDC and the WHO is closely monitoring 
the situation especially from an epidemiological 
point of view. Obviously, the complete ban on 
any import from Turkey of live birds and poultry 
products adopted in early October 2005 remains 
in place.
Experts at WHO and elsewhere believe that 
the world is now closer to another influenza pan-
demic than at any time since 1968, when the last 
of the previous century's three pandemics occu-
rred. WHO uses a series of six phases of pande-
mic alert as a system for informing the world of 
the seriousness of the threat and of the need to 
launch progressively more intense preparedne-
ss activities (Table 2). The designation of phases, 
including decisions on when to move from one 
phase to another, is made by the Director-Gene-
ral of WHO (15). Each phase of alert coincides 
with a series of recommended activities to be un-
dertaken by WHO, the international commu-
nity, governments, and industry. Changes from 
one phase to another are triggered by several fac-
tors, which include the epidemiological behavi-
or of the disease and the characteristics of circu-
lating viruses. The world is presently in phase 3: a 
new influenza virus subtype is causing disease in 
humans, but is not yet spreading efficiently and is 
not yet sustainable among humans.
January 12, 2006
Laboratory tests conducted in Turkey have 
confirmed detection of the H5 subtype of avian 
influenza virus in samples from two new patients. 
The patients are residents of Sanliurfa Provin-
ce, near the southern border with Syria, and Siirt 
Province, which is neighboring to Van in the ea-
stern part of the country. Human cases have now 
been reported from nine of the country’s 81 pro-
vinces. Both patients are young children, aged 4 
and 6 years, and both have a documented history 
of direct contact with diseased birds. In Sanliurfa 
Province, outbreaks in backyard poultry are now 
thought to date back to late November 2005. Al-
together, agricultural officials have confirmed 
poultry outbreaks in 11 provinces and are inve-
stigating possible outbreaks in an additional 14 
provinces across the country.
Laboratory tests completed today in Tur-
key have detected the H5 virus subtype in post-
mortem specimens taken from a 12-year-old 
girl, from Agri Province, who died on January 7, 
2006. The child was the sibling of two other pa-
Table 2. Phases of alert in the World Health Organization global influenza preparedness plan (15)
Level of alert İnfection risk and transmission Phase
1 Low risk of human cases inter-pandemic phase (new virus in animals, no human cases)
2 Higher risk of human cases
3 No or very limited human-to-human transmission pandemic alert (new virus in humans)
4 Evidence of increased human-to-human transmission
5 Evidence of significant human-to-human transmission
6 Efficient and sustained human-to-human transmission pandemic
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tients who died earlier. Their infection with the 
H5N1 virus was subsequently confirmed by a 
WHO collaborating laboratory in the UK. The 
Ministry of Health is now reporting 18 labora-
tory-confirmed cases, of which three, all from the 
same family, have been fatal.
Arrangements have been made to send spe-
cimens from several patients to the UK colla-
borating laboratory for further analysis. Due to 
official holidays in Turkey, specimens are not 
expected to arrive in the UK before January 16, 
2006. The head of the collaborating laboratory 
is now in Ankara to support diagnostic work at 
the country’s national influenza center. Ways 
are being sought to expedite the testing of pati-
ent samples. High awareness of the disease in the 
Turkish population, combined with almost dai-
ly reports of poultry outbreaks in new areas, has 
resulted in a large number of people concerned 
about exposure and seeking reassurance.
The rapid assessment of patients with a po-
ssible exposure history is providing a unique op-
portunity to learn more about the disease in hu-
mans. It is also generating data that can be used 
to assess the efficacy of antiviral drugs, as most 
people with an exposure history or respiratory 
symptoms are receiving oseltamivir either for 
prophylaxis or very early after the onset of symp-
toms.
Members of the international teams, in Van 
Province and Ankara, are working with local 
experts to plan relevant studies. These studies sho-
uld deepen the understanding of the epidemiolo-
gy of the disease, including the possibility that any 
human-to-human transmission may have occu-
rred, the vulnerability to infection for health care 
workers and other occupationally-exposed groups, 
and the possibility that milder forms of the disease 
might be occurring in the general population.
January 16, 2006 – Final Report
Laboratory tests conducted in Turkey’s nati-
onal influenza center in Ankara have confirmed 
two additional cases of human infection with the 
H5N1 avian influenza virus. The first newly con-
firmed case is a 5-year-old boy from the district of 
Dogubayazit in Agri Province. He remains hos-
pitalized in a stable condition. His 14-year-old si-
ster died on January 15, 2006 of a respiratory di-
sease with clinical features similar to those seen 
in H5N1 infection. Test results received on Ja-
nuary 16, 2006 have confirmed the infection. As 
with all other cases seen in Turkey to date, both 
children developed illness following direct expo-
sure to diseased poultry. Ducks began dying in 
the family’s household flock on January 1, 2006. 
On that day, the girl, assisted by her brother, sla-
ughtered a duck. Both children developed symp-
toms of fever >39°C on January 4, 2006 and 
both were hospitalized on January 11, 2006. No 
other family members have developed signs of ill-
ness. These newly confirmed cases bring the total 
in Turkey to 21, four of which were fatal. Of the 
21 cases, 18 have been children aged between 4 
and 18 years.
Discussion
All available evidence indicates that no susta-
ined human-to-human transmission has occu-
rred. As in Asia, contact with infected birds is the 
principal source of infection. The risk of infecti-
on for travelers to Turkey is negligible provided 
direct contact with dead or diseased domestic 
and wild birds is avoided.
The WHO Collaborating Centre for Refe-
rence and Research on influenza at the Medical 
Research Center National Institute for Medi-
cal Research in Mill Hill, London, has comple-
ted genetic and antigenic analyses of viruses reco-
vered from the first two fatal human cases in the 
Turkish outbreak.
Information provided to WHO indicates 
that these viruses are very similar to current avi-
an H5N1 viruses isolated from birds in Turkey. 
They are also closely related to viruses isolated 
from the large outbreak in migratory birds that 
occurred at the Qinghai Lake nature reserve in 
Croat Med J 2006;47:7-15
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China, beginning in late April of 2005. These 
analyses indicate that the Turkish viruses are sen-
sitive to both classes of antiviral drugs, including 
oseltamivir and amantadine. WHO and collabo-
rating experts will review the data on amantadine 
sensitivity. Oseltamivir remains the drug of first 
choice recommended by WHO.
Virus from one of the patients shows mutati-
ons at the receptor-binding site. One of the mu-
tations has been seen previously in viruses isola-
ted from a small outbreak in Hong Kong in 2003 
(two cases, one of which was fatal) and from the 
2005 outbreak in Viet Nam. Research has indica-
ted that the Hong Kong 2003 viruses bind prefe-
rentially to human cell receptors more so than to 
avian cell receptors. Researchers at the Mill Hill 
Laboratory anticipate that the Turkish virus will 
also have the same characteristics (10).
The present WHO level of pandemic alert 
remains at phase 3: human infections with a new 
virus subtype are occurring, but the vast majority 
of these infections are acquired directly from ani-
mals.
With more than 100 million birds either 
dead from infection or culled, the present ou-
tbreak of avian influenza in Asia and Anatolia 
is unprecedented in size. The virus is capable of 
transmitting to human, causing lethal infections, 
but as yet the virus does not easily transmit from 
human to human. However, there is a substantial 
risk of either re-assortment of virus (combinati-
on of avian and human influenza), or adaptation 
of the influenza virus to humans. If this happens 
we may be on the verge of a new influenza pan-
demic with grave consequences both for human 
health and the world economy. The present situ-
ation emphasizes the importance of good surve-
illance and updated pandemic plans in all coun-
tries. To minimize the risk of double infection 
and viral adaptations into forms that may cause 
human-to-human transmission, persons with an 
occupational exposure to highly pathogenic avi-
an influenza (HPAI) should be vaccinated aga-
inst influenza A. International collaboration on 
surveillance of epidemics among birds and hu-
mans is needed. Low- and middle-income co-
untries are likely to need international support 
to meet surveillance requirements according to 
WHO guidelines.
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